Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution Protocols Over Noisy Channels

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A continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol based on squeezed states and heterodyne detection is introduced and shown to attain higher secret key rates over a noisy line than any other one-way Gaussian protocol. This increased resistance to channel noise can be understood as resulting from purposely adding noise to the signal that is converted into the secret key. This notion of noise-enhanced tolerance to noise also provides a better physical insight into the poorly understood discrepancies between the previously defined families of Gaussian protocols.

Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a prominent application of quantum information sciences, enabling two partners (Alice and Bob) to share a secret key, which in turn allows them to communicate with full security. A particular class of QKD protocols based on the Gaussian modulation of Gaussian states has attracted much attention over the past years because its associated (homodyne or heterodyne) detection scheme offers the prospect of very high key rates \cite{1}. In these so-called continuous-variable (CV) protocols, the data which make the key are encoded into continuous-spectrum quantum observables, namely, the quadrature components of a mode of the light field. These protocols fall to date into three families, depending on which states and detection schemes are used.

In the first one, Alice uses a source of squeezed states that are randomly displaced along the squeezed quadrature, while Bob performs homodyne detection \cite{2}. The experimental implementation is much simplified with the second one, which is based at Alice’s side on coherent states modulated in both quadratures instead of squeezed states modulated along a single quadrature \cite{3}. This second protocol was first demonstrated experimentally in Ref. \cite{4}, while its implementation with optical telecom components was reported in Ref. \cite{5}. In the third protocol, Alice still uses coherent states but Bob performs heterodyne instead of homodyne detection, measuring both quadratures together, hence eliminating the need for an active random basis choice \cite{6}.

In this Letter, we introduce a fourth CV QKD protocol based on squeezed states and heterodyne detection, which, surprisingly, happens to outperform all previous Gaussian protocols when the noise level in the quantum channel is high. This hitherto overlooked protocol, completing the family of Gaussian protocols, had not been found earlier because, at first sight, it serves no purpose measuring both quadratures when only one of them (the squeezed quadrature) carries the key. This striking effect can, however, be understood by exploring the analogy with qubit-based QKD and realizing that adding some noise on the data of the appropriate partner during the error-correction phase may result in an increase of the secret key rate \cite{7}. We indeed can explain the improved resistance to noise of our new protocol by using its equivalence with the first protocol, based on squeezed states and homodyne measurement, supplemented with noisy postprocessing. This analysis also allows us to construct the family of optimal Gaussian protocols with respect to channel excess noise.

It has been known after Ref. \cite{7} that the performance of qubit-based QKD protocols can be increased by having Alice adding some noise to her data in the error-correction phase. This additional classical noise makes the protocol more robust against noise in the quantum channel because it is more detrimental to Eve than to Bob. More precisely, for each quantum channel, there is an optimal level of noise that Alice should add in order to maximize the secret key rate. An explanation of this phenomena can be found in Ref. \cite{8} using an entanglement-based description of BB84 together with a modified version of Shor-Preskill’s unconditional security proof \cite{9}. Note that entangled-based CV QKD protocols have also been introduced in Ref. \cite{10}, but entanglement will only be used in what follows as a tool to analyze all four prepare-and-measure protocols on the same footing. We shall show that this counterintuitive effect of noise also appears, though in disguise, in the case of CV QKD protocols. This is not straightforward, however, because of the distinction that exists between direct reconciliation (DR) and reverse reconciliation (RR), a feature which plays a central role in CV QKD. In contrast to qubit-based QKD, it is indeed crucial to specify whether Alice or Bob is the reference during the error-correction postprocessing phase. In DR, Alice plays this role and the maximal achievable range is known to be 3 dB; in RR, there is no theoretical limitation to this range \cite{4}.

In the following, we will focus on the security of CV QKD against collective attacks, where Eve interacts individually with each signal pulse sent by Alice but applies a joint measurement at the end of the classical postprocessing stage. Studying this class of attacks is...
random number generator on Bob’s side unnecessary since time multiplexing technique, as in Ref. [13]. At Bob’s oscillator can be transmitted over the same fiber by using a modulation. The quantum signal and local shown in Fig. 1. The use of heterodyning makes the quantum signal is heterodyne measured. The latter measurement consists in splitting the quantum signal (and LO) in two with the extracted from the LO. The attenuation (A) thus depends on quantification of the random bit r encoding her chosen quadratures and Bob keeping as his final string of data b the measurements (b_x or b_y) matching Alice’s choices. This step is followed by the channel estimation, where Alice and Bob reveal a fraction of their data in order to estimate T and CH, which allows them to bound Eve’s information. Subsequently, Alice and Bob apply a RR algorithm, such as low-density parity-check codes [13] combined with a discretization operation. This operation outputs two perfectly correlated binary strings. Finally, both partners apply a privacy amplification algorithm based, e.g., on hash functions [13], which produces a shared binary secret key from their perfectly correlated data. As shown in Ref. [7], the achievable RR secret key rate reads \begin{equation} K = I(a:b) - S(b:E), \end{equation}
where I(a:b) is the Shannon information between Alice and Bob’s data while S(b:E) is Eve’s information on b given by the Holevo quantity \begin{equation} S(b:E) = S(\rho E) - \int dp\rho (bp)S(\rho ^{bp}), \end{equation}\text{given that Eve can be assumed to hold the purification of the system and that Gaussian attacks are optimal, we can directly compute K from the covariance matrix } \gamma_{AB} \text{ inferred from the channel estimation.}

Tolerance to noise.—In Fig. 2(a), we show that this new protocol performs better than all previous RR protocols in sufficient to prove unconditional security of qubit-based QKD protocols [11], and we take for granted here the conjecture that the same holds for CV QKD [12]. In addition, we restrict our study to Gaussian collective attacks as they are known to be optimal [12]. Furthermore, we consider RR as it works over longer distances. The corollary is that Alice’s and Bob’s roles must be interchanged when analyzing the tolerance to noise (indeed, qubit-based QKD uses DR). This leads us to introduce a fourth Gaussian protocol.

Protocol.—The first stage consists in quantum communication over the quantum channel, characterized by the transmittivity T and added noise variance referred to the input \chi_C. Alice generates a random bit r and a real number a drawn from a Gaussian distribution G(a) of variance \nu_a. Subsequently, she generates a squeezed vacuum state of covariance matrix \text{diag}(1/\nu, \nu) and displaces it by an amount (a, 0); see Fig. 1. Before sending the state together with the local oscillator through the quantum channel, she applies a random dephasing of \theta = r\pi/2 to the state. This dephasing is equivalent to randomly choosing to squeeze and displace either the x or p quadrature, as in Ref. [2]. Averaging the output states over G(a) gives the same (thermal) state for r = 0 and r = 1, which prevents Eve from extracting information on which quadrature was selected by Alice. This imposes the constraint \nu_a + 1/\nu = V on Alice’s modulation. The quantum signal and local oscillator can be transmitted over the same fiber by using a time multiplexing technique, as in Ref. [13]. At Bob’s station, the signal is first demultiplexed and subsequently measured by a standard heterodyne measurement, as shown in Fig. 1. The use of heterodyning makes the random number generator on Bob’s side unnecessary since there is no need to switch between the measurements of conjugated bases, just as in Ref. [6]. After repeating these steps many times, Alice ends up with a long string of data a correlated with Bob’s heterodyne data (b_x, b_y).

The second stage is the classical postprocessing stage, which serves to extract the secret key. It starts by Alice revealing the string of random bits r encoding her chosen quadratures and Bob keeping as his final string of data b the measurements (b_x or b_y) matching Alice’s choices. This step is followed by the channel estimation, where Alice and Bob reveal a fraction of their data in order to estimate T and CH, which allows them to bound Eve’s information. Subsequently, Alice and Bob apply a RR algorithm, such as low-density parity-check codes [13] combined with a discretization operation. This operation outputs two perfectly correlated binary strings. Finally, both partners apply a privacy amplification algorithm based, e.g., on hash functions [13], which produces a shared binary secret key from their perfectly correlated data. As shown in Ref. [7], the achievable RR secret key rate reads

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Tolerance to noise.—In Fig. 2(a), we show that this new protocol performs better than all previous RR protocols in
terms of tolerable excess noise, i.e., the lowest $\epsilon = \chi_c - (1 - T)/T$ that gives a zero secret key rate. In realistic implementations of CV QKD, the excess noise generally comes from the laser’s phase noise and imperfections in the modulation, as discussed in Ref. [5], so that it can be considered as approximately independent of the length of the fiber. The higher tolerable $\epsilon$ does not mean, however, that the new protocol gives higher rates regardless of the channel transmittivity. As shown in Fig. 2(b), it is only for losses higher than a given threshold that it gives a higher secret key rate than the protocol of Ref. [2].

In the new protocol, Bob disregards either $b_x$ or $b_y$ during the postprocessing stage, depending on Alice’s quadrature choice $r$. This is equivalent to tracing out the mode that is not used in Bob’s heterodyne measurement, so that the new protocol can be viewed as a noisy version of the protocol based on squeezed states and homodyne measurement [2] where Bob inserts a balanced beam splitter before his measurement. The losses induced by this beam splitter translate into noise once Bob classically amplifies his outcome to match the initial signal. Therefore, we have a clear demonstration that adding noise that is not controlled by Eve on Bob’s side can be beneficial in CV QKD for a RR protocol.

Interestingly, this effect has a counterpart in DR which remained unnoticed to date although it is visible with known protocols. We indeed observe in Ref. [14] that the homodyne protocol based on coherent states gives a better tolerance to excess noise in DR than that based on squeezed states. The reason is that the former protocol [3] can actually be viewed as a noisy version of the latter protocol [2], where the noise is now added by the same mechanism but on Alice’s side in the entanglement-based equivalent scheme; see Fig. 3. In this scheme, coherent states are prepared by Alice applying an heterodyne measurement, which can be viewed as a noisy homodyne measurement. We thus conclude that there is a beneficial effect of noise if added on the reference side of error correction (Alice in DR and Bob in RR). Clearly, adding noise on the other side is always detrimental as it decreases the information between the authorized parties without affecting the eavesdropper’s information.

**Optimal protocol.**—We now generalize the above new RR protocol to optimally resist against an arbitrary channel noise. In Fig. 3, we exhibit an entanglement-based description of CV QKD protocols, where Bob replaces his heterodyne measurement by an ideal homodyne measurement preceded by a general Gaussian phase-insensitive added noise. This models the following physical situations: (i) inefficient homodyne detection with efficiency $T_B$ and electronic noise variance $\nu = (1 - T_B)(N - 1)$; (ii) perfect homodyne detection followed by a classical Gaussian added noise of variance $\chi_D = (1 - T_B)N/T_B$; (iii) any combination of the previous cases giving the same $\chi_D$. The secret key rate can be calculated using the following technique. First we use the fact that Eve’s system $E$ purifies $AB$, that is, $S(E) = S(AB)$. Secondly, after Bob’s projective measurement yielding $b$, the system $AEFG$ being pure, we have $S(E|b) = S(AFG|b)$. For Gaussian states $S(AFG|b)$ is the same for all $b$’s, being just a function of the covariance matrix $\gamma_{AB}$. Thus, we obtain,

$$K = I(a:b) - S(AB) + S(AFG|b),$$

which can be calculated from the covariance matrix

$$\gamma_{AB} = \begin{bmatrix} x & z \\ z & y \end{bmatrix},$$

where $x = V, \ y = T(V + \chi_c), \ z = \sqrt{T(V^2 - 1)}, \ \| = \text{diag}(1, 1),$ and $\sigma = \text{diag}(1, -1)$.
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 is a function of the symplectic eigenvalues \( \lambda_{1,2} \) of \( Y_{AB} \) which reads
 \[ S(AB) = G((\lambda_1 - 1)/2) + G((\lambda_2 - 1)/2), \]
 where \( G(x) = (x + 1)\log(x + 1) - x\log x \) is the von Neumann entropy of a thermal state and
 \[ \lambda_{1,2}^2 = \frac{1}{2} \left[ \Delta \pm \sqrt{\Delta^2 - 4D^2} \right]. \]
 Here, we have used the notation \( \Delta = x^2 + y^2 - 2z^2 \) and \( D = xy - z^2 \). Finally, \( S(AFGB) \) is a function of the symplectic eigenvalues \( \lambda_{3,4} \) similar to (5) where \( \lambda_{3,4}^2 \) are solutions of the second order polynomial \( \lambda^4 - A\lambda^2 + B = 0 \) with
 \[ A = \frac{1}{y + \chi_D} [y + xD + \chi_D \Delta] \]
 \[ B = \frac{D}{y + \chi_D} [x + \chi_D D]. \]
 By tuning Bob’s added noise \( \chi_D \), it is possible to maximize the secret key rate, as shown in Fig. 4. More importantly, the resulting family of optimal protocols exhibit the highest tolerance to noise among all Gaussian CV QKD protocols, as demonstrated in Fig. 2(a) (crosses).

Note that although Bob’s heterodyne measurement is useful to get an insight on this enhanced tolerance to noise, Bob eventually disregards one of the two quadratures in the actual protocol. Thus, up to a factor of 2 in the key rate, he may as well apply a (noisy) homodyne measurement and keep the outcome only when he has measured the right quadrature. Finally, instead of using a random numbers generator to generate the noise \( \chi_D \), it is certainly more interesting for Bob to do it physically by tuning the efficiency of his detector.

**Conclusion.**—We have proposed a new CV QKD protocol using squeezed states and heterodyne detection, which outperforms all known Gaussian protocols in terms of resistance to noise. This enhanced robustness can be interpreted as the continuous-variable counterpart of the effect, first described in Ref. [7], that adding noise in the error-correction postprocessing phase may increase the secret key rate of one-way qubit-based protocols. Then, we have studied the impact of a general Gaussian phase-insensitive noise on the secret key rate, and have shown that for each quantum channel (characterized by its transmittivity \( T \) and added noise variance \( \chi_C \)), there is an optimal noise \( \chi_B \) that Bob must add to maximize the secret key rate. The resulting protocol also exhibits the highest resistance to noise among all Gaussian protocols. This noise-enhanced tolerance to noise is particularly interesting for reverse-reconciliation CV QKD protocols, which work over larger distances, but, interestingly, it also has an analogue for direct-reconciliation protocols. This gives a physical explanation to the previously observed—but poorly understood—discrepancies between the efficiencies of Gaussian protocols.

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